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首页 » 威尔鑫金评连载（※标题为不定期开放的会员版） » 美联储犯蠢源于数据误导？-威尔鑫
美联储犯蠢源于数据误导？-威尔鑫 |
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2022-05-09 10:16:28
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美联储犯蠢源于数据误导？ 2022年05月08日 威尔鑫投资咨询研究中心 首席分析师 杨易君 操作参考公众号：杨易君黄金与金融投资 yangyijun1616 这是一篇美联储官员关于在此轮大通胀中美联储为何行动迟缓的原因演讲： 首先，2020年国会对美联储货币调控有个双重任务目标：改善劳动就业市场，控制物价。 2020年12月，所有19名（12人有投票权）美联储官员都预测美国长期通胀不会超过2%，甚至锚定2%。 2021年3月，通胀数据突然向上时，此文发言者（Governor Christopher J. Waller）有一定警觉，认为通胀会上行（但也没想到这么严重），他认为经济面临下行风险，认为双重任务中的通胀目标已经达到，后面劳动力市场也可能顺应改善。 其对2021年4-10月的经济场景描述不多。但重点强调了9月利率会议中，美联储官员们被很多信息误导了： 误导之一，他们认为通胀是暂时现象。因为很多令通胀井喷的因素，看起来都是暂时的：比如供应链与商品需求。此外，最严重的误导是，尽管2021年10月美国CPI同比增速已高达6%，但4-9月个人核心消费者物价指数是下降的，从0.62%下降至0.24%，故美联储认为通胀是暂时。 误导之二，作为美联储货币政策调控目标成效之二的劳动力就业市场，2021年8月就业数据让美联储官员们狠狠地懵圈了。原本预期7、8月每月新增就业会达到80-100万，那么就应该在9月货币政策会议上宣布缩减资产购买计划。7月实际新增就业人数过100万，但8月原本预期增加75万的就业实际仅增加了23.5万，谁知9月就业数据更让人震惊，仅新增就业19.4万人，这让原本9月缩减资产购买计划的决定受到沉重打击…… 故虽然物价已超过美联储调控目标，但作为任务之二的劳动力市场看起来并不健康，故美联储内部官员分歧很大，最终选择妥协观望。 喜剧的是，10月就业强劲反弹至53.1万人，之前就业数据也被大幅上修…… 故笔者认为Christopher J. Waller想表达美联储被数据误导了：被核心个人消费者物价指数，被8、9月就业统计数据误导了！ 但笔者认为，即便美联储在2021年9月开始采取行动缩减资产购买计划，对抑制当前通胀有用吗？关于2021年4-9月核心个人消费者物价指数带来的误导，是方法问题，还是数据采样统计问题？有不有纵容投机推动通胀的“体制”问题？思考到这个层面时，不妨想一想我们近两年关于对商品投机多方面整治力度，从政策、法律、调控等多方面打击、抑制商品投机，亦或是我们没有步欧美恶劣通胀后尘的重要原因之一。 作者谈到疫情的复杂局面是通胀失控的原因，这其中，美国政府当局的疫情管控策略毫无疑问地恶化了通胀。当前美国致力于恶化俄乌局势，仍是在致力于恶化全球通胀，恶化美国通胀。 故很大程度上，此轮美国大通胀，既有美联储行动缓慢（即便甩锅被数据误导）原因，也有政府疫情管控、物价管调控效率低下的原因。同时又说明通胀成因何其复杂！2021年美联储对通胀局势的集体误判，我认为是本届美联储能力原因。笔者前天在哪篇文章中看到对美联储主席鲍威尔不是金融科班出身的评论，其本质也是对本届美联储水平的怀疑。 此外，文章后段描述了美联储提前“用嘴”升息的效果，令2年期国债收益率从0.25%上升至0.75%，对金融市场的影响就好似两次升息25点，这不过是为美联储实际行动迟缓找点面子而已，且揭示了美联储迷恋用嘴升息以求达到抑制通胀的目的，实际可能“非常蠢”！ May 06, 2022 Reflections on Monetary Policy in 2021 At the 2022 Hoover Institution Monetary Conference, Stanford, California I want to thank the organizers for inviting me to speak here today. The discussion has focused on the following question: "How did the Fed get so far behind the curve?" My response is to relate how my view of the economy changed over the course of 2021 and how that evolving view shaped my policy position. When thinking about this question, there are three points that need to be considered. First, the Fed was not alone in underestimating the strength of inflation that revealed itself in late 2021. Second, to determine whether the Fed was behind the curve, one must take a position on the evolving health of the labor market during 2021. Finally, setting policy in real time can create what appear to be policy errors after the fact due to data revisions. Let me start by reminding everyone of two immutable facts about setting monetary policy in the United States. First, we have a dual mandate from the Congress: maximum employment and price stability. Whether you believe this is the appropriate mandate or not, it is the law of the land, and it is our job to pursue both objectives. Second, policy is set by a large committee of up to 12 voting members and a total of 19 participants in our discussions. This structure brings a wide range of views to the table and a diverse set of opinions on how to interpret incoming economic data and how best to respond. We need to reconcile those views and reach a consensus that we believe will move the economy toward our mandate. This process may lead to more gradual changes in policy as members have to compromise in order to reach a consensus. Back in September and December 2020, respectively, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) laid out guidance for raising the federal funds rate off the zero lower bound and for tapering asset purchases. We said that we would "aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time" to ensure that it averages 2 percent over time and that inflation expectations stay anchored. We also said that the Fed would keep buying $120 billion per month in securities until "substantial further progress" was made toward our dual-mandate objectives. It is important to stress that views varied among FOMC participants on what was "some time" and "substantial further progress." The metrics for achieving these outcomes also varied across participants. A few months later, in March 2021, I made my first submission for the Summary of Economic Projections as an FOMC member. My projection had inflation above 2 percent for 2021 and 2022, with unemployment close to my long-run estimate by the second half of 2022. Given this projection, which I believed was consistent with the guidance from December, I penciled in lifting off the zero lower bound in 2022, with the second half of the year in mind. To lift off from the ZLB in the second half of 2022, I believed tapering of asset purchases would have to start in the second half of 2021 and conclude by the third quarter of 2022. This projection was based on my judgment that the economy would heal much faster than many expected. This was not 2009, and expectations of a slow, grinding recovery were inaccurate, in my view. In April 2021, I said the economy was "ready to rip," and it did.1 I chose to look at the unemployment rate and job creation as the labor market indicators I would use to assess whether we had made "substantial further progress." My projection was also based on the belief that the jump in inflation that occurred in March 2021 would be more persistent than many expected. There was a range of views on the Committee. Eleven of my colleagues did not have a rate hike penciled in until after 2023. With regard to future inflation, 13 participants projected inflation in 2022 would be at or below our 2 percent target. In the March 2021 SEP, no Committee member expected inflation to be over 3 percent for 2021. As I argued in a speech last December, this view was consistent with private-sector economic forecasts.2 When inflation broke loose in March 2021, even though I had expected it to run above 2 percent in 2021 and 2022, I never thought it would reach the very high levels we have seen in recent months. Indeed, I expected it would eventually fade, due to the nature of these shocks. All the suspected drivers of this surge in inflation appeared to be temporary: the one-time stimulus from fiscal policy, supply chain shocks that previous experience indicated would ease soon, and a surge in demand for goods. In addition, we had very accommodative monetary policy that I believed would end in 2022. The issue in my mind was whether these factors would start fading away later in 2021 or in 2022. Over the summer of 2021, the labor market and other data related to economic activity came in as I expected, and so I argued publicly that we were rapidly approaching "substantial further progress" on the employment leg of our mandate. In the June Summary of Economic Projections, seven participants had liftoff in 2022 and only five participants projected liftoff after 2023. Also, unlike the March SEP, every Committee participant now expected inflation to be over 3 percent in 2021 and just five believed inflation would be at 2 percent or below in 2022. In addition, the vast majority of participants now saw risks associated with inflation weighted to the upside. The June 2021 minutes also describe the vigorous discussion about tapering asset purchases. Numerous participants said that new data indicated that tapering should begin sooner than anticipated.3 Thus, in June, after observing high inflation for only three months, the Committee was moving in a hawkish direction and was considering tapering sooner and pulling liftoff forward. At the July FOMC meeting, the minutes show that most participants believed that "substantial further progress" had been made on inflation but not employment.4 Tapering was not viewed as imminent by most participants. Again, individual participants had different metrics for evaluating the health of the labor market, and this approach influenced how each thought about policy. So, in my view, one cannot address the question of "how did the Fed get so far behind the curve?" without taking a stand on the health of the labor market as we moved through 2021. Based on the incoming data over the summer, my position was that we would soon achieve the substantial further progress needed to start tapering of asset purchases—in particular, our purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities—and that we needed to "go early and go fast" on tapering our asset purchases to position ourselves for rate hikes in 2022 should we need to tighten policy.5 I also argued that, if the July and August job reports came in around the forecast values of 800,000 to 1 million job gains per month, we should commence tapering our asset purchases at the September 2021 FOMC meeting. The July report was indeed over 1 million new jobs, but then the August report shocked us by reporting only 235,000 new jobs when the consensus forecast was for 750,000. I considered this a punch in the gut and relevant to a decision on when to start tapering.6 Nevertheless, the September FOMC statement noted that the economy had made progress toward the Committee's goals and that, if progress continued, it would soon be time to taper.7 Up until October, monthly core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation was actually slowing. As shown in Figure 1, it went from 0.62 percent in April to 0.24 percent for the month of September. The September jobs report was another shock, with only 194,000 jobs created. So, up until the first week of October 2021, the story of high inflation being temporary was holding up, and the labor market improvements had slowed but were continuing. Based on the incoming data, the FOMC announced the start of tapering at its early November meeting.8 It was the October and November consumer price index (CPI) reports that showed that the deceleration of inflation from April to September was short lived and year-over-year inflation had topped 6 percent. It became clear that the high inflation realizations were not as temporary as originally thought. And the October jobs report showed a significant rebound with 531,000 jobs created and big upward revisions to the previous two months. It was at this point—with a clearer picture of inflation and revised labor market data in hand—that the FOMC pivoted. In its December meeting, the Committee accelerated tapering, and the SEP showed that each individual participant projected an earlier liftoff in 2022 with a median projection of three rate hikes in 2022. These forecasts and forward guidance had a significant effect on raising market interest rates, even though we did nothing with our primary policy tool, the federal funds rate, in December 2021. It is worth noting that markets had the same view of likely policy—federal funds rate futures in November and December called for three hikes in 2022, indicating an economic outlook that was similar to the Committee's. Given this description of how policy evolved over 2021, did the Fed fall far behind the curve? First, I want to emphasize that forecasting is hard for everyone, especially in a pandemic. In terms of missing on inflation, policymakers' projections looked very much like most of the public's. For example, as shown in table 1, the median SEP forecast for 2021 Q4/Q4 PCE inflation was very similar to the consensus from the Blue Chip, which is a compilation of private sector forecasts. In short, nearly everyone was behind the curve when it came to forecasting the magnitude and persistence of inflation. Second, as I mentioned, you cannot answer this question without taking a stand on the employment leg of our mandate. There was a clear difference in views on this and on what indicators should be looked at to determine whether we had met the 'substantial further progress" criteria we laid out in our December 2020 guidance. Some of us concluded the labor market was healing fast and we pushed for earlier and faster withdrawal of accommodation. For others, data suggested the labor market was not healing that fast and it was not optimal to withdraw policy accommodation soon. Many of our critics tend to focus only on the inflation aspect of our mandate and ignore the employment leg of our mandate. But we cannot. So, what may appear as a policy error to some was viewed as appropriate policy by others based on their views regarding the health of the labor market. Third, one must account for setting policy in real time. The Committee was getting mixed signals from the labor market data in August and September. Two consecutive weak job reports didn't square with a rapidly falling unemployment rate. Later that fall, and then with the Labor Department's 2021 revisions, we found that payrolls were quite steady over the course of the year. As shown in table 2, revisions to changes in payroll employment since late last summer have been quite substantial. From the original reports to the current estimate, the change in payroll employment has been revised up nearly 1.5 million. As the revisions came in, a consensus grew that the labor market was much stronger than we originally thought. If we knew then what we know now, I believe the Committee would have accelerated tapering and raised rates sooner. But no one knew, and that's the nature of making monetary policy in real time. Finally, if one believes we were behind the curve in 2021, how far behind were we? In a world of forward guidance, one simply cannot look at the policy rate to judge the stance of policy. Even though we did not actually move the policy rate in 2021, we used forward guidance to start raising market rates starting with the September 2021 statement, which indicated tapering was coming soon. The 2-year Treasury yield, which I view as a good market indicator of our policy stance, went from approximately 25 basis points in late September 2021 to 75 basis points by late December. That is the equivalent, in my mind, of two 25 basis point policy rate hikes for impacting the financial markets. When looked at this way, how far behind the curve could we have possibly been if, using forward guidance, one views rate hikes effectively beginning in September 2021? |
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